The Utilitarian Argument for Ethical Vegetarianism

This is just for Anthony; it is too horrible for the rest of you to see. No Scotus, sorry :(

The Utilitarian argument for ethical vegetarianism is a relatively simple one. The Utilitarian asserts that:

1. The ethical act in any given situation is that which maximizes overall pleasure and minimizes overall pain.

2. The consumption of meat and animal products causes a significant amount of pain for a trivial amount of pleasure.

3. The consumption of meat and animal products is not essential to the survival of human animals.

Therefore,

4. The consumption of meat and animal products is wrong.


Of course, (act) Utilitarianism leaves room for extraordinary cases, but for the vast majority of human persons living in developed nations, it seems that the consumption of meat and animal products is a morally unsound practice. In this paper, I will argue that the argument for ethical vegetarianism is successful, using the flawed arguments against the position in order to demonstrate the truth of the Utilitarian premises. After that, I will briefly discuss Steven Davis's argument for a mostly-vegan diet that includes the meat of some large herbivores, concluding that we have a long way to go in practical terms before the issues Davis brings to our attention become truly relevant to Utilitarian calculations.


The first premise of the Utilitarian argument requires no argument; it is a basic tenet of the ethical theory, and all Utilitarians accept it. It is not within the scope of this paper to argue for Utilitarianism itself, and so premise 1 will be assumed throughout the rest of the paper. The second premise does most of the work for the Utilitarian, and is clearly the most controversial of the premises. I'll deal with the second part of the premise (the consumption of meat and animal products causes a trivial amount of pleasure) first, as its force is much easier to comprehend and digest (pun, unfortunately, intended).


We like the taste of meat, and at least in my own society, it plays a central role in our diet. When both of these considerations are combined, it is easy to overestimate the importance of the pleasure we get from eating meat. After all, it is nearly essential to the way most persons in my society think about food, and we get great pleasure out of eating it. That said, we should understand by now that this is not the only way to think about our diet, nor is it necessarily the best way. The pleasures of eating meat are not necessary (or, perhaps more controversially, sufficient) to the pleasure of eating, and it is entirely possible that, once habituated to an alternate dietary pattern, new, meatless pleasures may even outstrip those of the meat-based diet.


Even if we were to assume that there would be a loss in pleasure, that loss is not in itself decisive. For example, let's imagine that the production of pork involved the treatment of permanently developmentally disabled humans in the same way that pigs are treated on factory farms. We're not eating people when we eat pork, but this treatment is essential to pork production, and so our pork-related pleasure is inextricably linked to the pain of permanently developmentally disabled humans. If this knowledge were to come to the knowledge of the general public, the outcry would be tremendous, and I believe that the pork industry would be devastated. We like the pleasure of eating pork, but almost no one would believe it to be worth that much pain. If this is the case, then the pleasure we obtain from eating meat is importantly trivial, and can be outweighed by a significant amount of pain.


But is the pain experienced by animals in factory farms (by far the main source of animal-related products in developed nations) significant enough to outweigh our pleasure? The Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA) seems to think not, but as we shall see, their arguments are less than convincing. What the AAA calls “modern animal housing” (i.e. factory farms) is “scientifically designed for the specific needs of the animal, such as the regular availability of fresh water and nutritionally balanced feed.” (AAA 237) This is undeniably true; the proprietors of factory farms make every effort to feed their stock. Of course, what they do not say about the conditions is much more revealing than what they do. There's no mention made of the egg hens crammed four or five to a cage, with individual space the size of a sheet of paper, or how those hens cannot stand comfortably (for nearly every moment of their lives) because of the wire floor designed to allow easier elimination of the animals' waste. They do not mention the bare stalls that pigs are made to live in, unable to build a nest or indulge their natural propensity for cleanliness. Nor do they mention the fact that cattle are prevented from eating the grasses and other roughage that their digestive systems are designed to handle because the cattle grow faster and the meat tastes better if they're fed corn and soybeans. These animals are prevented from fulfilling their instinctual desires and are given literally nothing to do but eat. This lack of diversion and inability to engage in instinctual behaviors leads to “vices,” and the AAA provides an attempt to justify their means of dealing with them by stating that “hens may have their beaks trimmed - not removed - to avoid injury to each other as a result of the bird's natural cannibalistic tendencies... with hogs... tails may be docked or shortened to end a natural tendency toward tail biting”. (AAA 239, emphasis mine) Hens don't peck at each other naturally, nor do pigs bite each other's tails – when allowed a “normal” environment, pigs and chickens are not afflicted with the anxiety and boredom that leads to such “vices.” It is only in extreme conditions like those on the factory farm that such undesirable behaviors arise.


Finally, the AAA attempts to make a distinction between what an animal “wants” and what an animal “needs.” They maintain that an animal may “want” to explore and wander freely, but that is not always in the animal's best interests. Though such a list is not provided, I'll assume that such things as food, water, protection from the elements, and human supervision are “needs.” If this is the case, then such frivolous things as maternal deprivation, the inability to interact in a natural way with members of an animal's species and the animal's environment, and the inability to partake in a natural diet (indeed, one that does not consist in unknowing cannibalism) are all merely denials of “wants” that the proprietors of factory farms can and do deny their stock. It seems clear that the mental and physical pain of the factory farm is non-trivial, and outweighs the pleasure of the consumption of meat and animal products, supporting premise 2.


Premise 3 should be non-controversial as well; many, many human animals have survived and thrived on a diet that does not partake in the consumption of meat or animal products. The vitamin B12 deficiency that may arise in some vegans can be avoided through careful dietary planning, or simply through a supplement, and vegetarians do not even have this issue to worry about. Many of us may not like the idea of a meatless diet, but that does not mean that such a diet would kill us. Indeed, abstaining from the fat and cholesterol that is rife in meat products may do wonders for those partaking of the Western diet, reducing the risk of heart disease and the need for medication of those with already-high cholesterol levels. I must repeat, simply because the idea of such a diet may not be attractive does not mean that we cannot take it up.


We have found the premises to be true, and the conclusion follows from the premises, so we ought to accept the conclusion of the argument, and accept ethical vegetarianism. There remains but one (rather unexpected) objection left. Steven L. Davis argues quite persuasively that if a vegan diet were universally adopted, the unnecessary pain of many animals would continue. Small birds, reptiles, and mammals such as rabbits, raccoons, sparrows, mice, and many others all live in the fields in which we grow crops, and the massive machinery that we use to sow, care for, and harvest these crops kills vast amounts of these animals. Because no one actually tracks the deaths of these animals (unlike, say, those of cattle), it is impossible to do more than estimate the amount of animal pain and death caused by a wholesale adoption of the vegan diet, but the numbers are large (almost two billion/year). While this number pales in comparison to the amount of animals slaughtered yearly, Davis suggests that we may significantly reduce the amount of animal pain and death by using large ruminant animals (i.e. cows) to reduce the machinery used to tend and harvest the crops, as well as provide an additional food source. Even with the adoption of the consumption of these animals (note that these animals are not raised nor do they live in factory farm conditions), the amount of animal pain and death drops dramatically, and what's important to the Utilitarian argument is the total amount of pain, not which animals are enduring it.


The two major problems for Davis's view, are a lack of data, and practical concerns. Until accurate data on animal deaths as a result of farm equipment is obtained, all we have are rough estimates, and such estimates make for weak and perhaps dubious calculations. On the other hand, we are nowhere near a universal vegan diet, and so the current problem is not “does the vegan diet maximize utility?” but rather “does the average human diet maximize utility?” The problem, while interesting and potentially important, is not of primary concern at this moment in history. Once Utilitarian ethical vegetarianism is adopted on a wide scale, then debates like the one that arises from Davis's insightful paper can come to the forefront of the discussion.



Works Cited


Animal Agriculture Alliance. "Animal Agriculture: Myths and Facts." The Animal Ethics Reader. Ed. Susan J. Armstrong. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2008. 236-42. Print.


Davis, Steven L. "The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing Large Herbivores, Not a Vegan Diet." The Animal Ethics Reader. Ed. Susan J. Armstrong. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2008. 243-47. Print.